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Introduction
With the beginning of the 21st century, calls for a more unified and effec-
tive European Union (EU or Union) human rights policy grow ever louder.
This Article will discuss the roots of such a policy and its future objectives
after discussing the current fractured EU human rights policy. The inter-
nal development and objectives of the European Community (EC) human
rights policy are markedly different from those of its external human rights
policy. Constitutional issues, such as legal bases, present an ongoing con-
cern for the Council of the European Union (Council) and the European
Commission (Commission) in drafting legislation, as well as for the Euro-
pean Court of Justice (ECJ) in interpreting such legislation. Although the
EU, the EC and their respective institutions acknowledge the legal difficul-
ties, they continue to press ahead with rhetoric espousing a firm commit-
ment to a coherent human rights policy rather than making a genuine
attempt to effectuate a consistent policy. Furthermore, when the policy is
applied, coherence and uniformity take a back seat to politics. Given such
a state of affairs, this Article will primarily focus on the EU's application of
its human rights policies in China and Myanmar,1 with the hope of eluci-
dating the true impetus for the EU's laudable goal of effectively promoting
fundamental human rights throughout the world.
I. Human Rights Policy Development Within the European
Community
A. The Establishment of the European Community
The European Economic Community began when Belgium, France, Ger-
many, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands signed the European Eco-
nomic Community Treaty (EEC Treaty), also known as the Treaty of Rome,
which came into force on January 1, 1958.2 The EEC, now the European
Community, is one of three Communities which together form the first of
the Three Pillars of the European Union. Unlike the First Pillar of the EC,
the Second and Third Pillars are essentially formalized intergovernmental
1. Due to space constraints, I will compare the EU's application of its human rights
policies in these countries only. However, as the wealth of literature illustrates, the EU
exercises great diversity in its efforts to attain human rights goals depending on its polit-
ical relations with numerous third countries.
2. TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY, Mar. 25 1957, 298
U.N.T.S. 11, amended by TREATY ON EUROPEAN UNION, Feb. 7, 1992, OJ. (C 224) 1 (1992)
[hereinafter TEU], amended by TREATY OF AMSTERDAM AMENDING THE TREATY ON EUROPEAN
UNION, THE TREATIES ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES AND CERTAIN RELATED
ACTS, Oct. 2, 1997, OJ. (C 340) 1 (1997) [hereinafter TREATY OF AMSTERDAM]. The
Treaty is now the CONSOLIDATED VERSION OF THE TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COM.
MUNITY, Nov. 10, 1997, OJ. (C 340) 3 (1997) [hereinafter EC TREATY]. The Member
States originally formed the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). TREATY
ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN COAL AND STEEL COMMUNITY, Apr. 18, 1951, 261 U.N.T.S.
140. This treaty is to expire in 2002. Subsequently, the original Member States signed
the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) Treaty to address the non-military
use of atomic energy. TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN ATOMIC ENERGY COMMUNITY,
Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 167. The Euratom Treaty was signed in conjunction with
the EEC Treaty and has no expiration date.
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cooperation entities. Title V of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) estab-
lishes the common foreign and security policy (CFSP), known as the Sec-
ond Pillar.3 Title VI of the TEU provides for police and judicial
cooperation in criminal matters, known as the Third Pillar.
4
B. The Development of Human Rights as a General Principle of EU
Law
Article 2 of the Treaty Establishing the European Community (EC Treaty)
states the broad objectives of the EC, most of which are economic in
nature. 5 Unlike the EC Treaty, the Treaty of Rome did not identify the
protection or promotion of human rights as one of the objectives of EC law.
Rather, the ECJ, through case law, developed the notion of fundamental
human rights as a general principle in EC law.6 Over the years, but espe-
cially in the wake of World War II, the concept of fundamental human
rights has evolved. The spectrum of human rights protections now ranges
from the protection of the physical body-as in the right to be free from
torture-to basic economic interests-as in the right to earn a living.7 In
tandem with this general expansion of human rights protections, the scope
of the EC Treaty has also broadened as the ECJ continues to apply and
create legal principles to protect fundamental human rights.
The creation of the strong protections of fundamental human rights in
EC law was not, however, intentional. Rather, it was a by-product of the
ECJ's efforts to establish the supremacy of EC law. The ECJ strives to
maintain supremacy of EC law over national law as a means of ensuring
the effectiveness of EC law.8 The ECJ first announced in Van Gend en
Loos,9 and then in Costa v. ENEL,10 the basic principle that EC law will
prevail over Member States' national laws." While Member State national
courts generally accept this principle today, this was not always the case.
German national courts were the first to argue that EC law should not
necessarily prevail over the German Constitution-especially not over
those provisions dealing with the protection of fundamental human
rights.12 In an effort to prevent a possible "rebellion" by the national
3. TEU tit. V.
4. Id. tit. VI.
5. EC TREATY art. 2. This Article uses the new treaty numbering that came into
effect on May 1, 1999 with the Treaty of Amsterdam. Unless otherwise designated, all
treaty references are to the European Community Treaty.
6. T. C. HARLEnY, THE FOUNDATIONS OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAWv 130-147 (4th ed.
1998) [hereinafter FOUNDATIONS].
7. Case 44/79, Hauer v. Land Rheinland-Pfaltz, [1979] E.C.R. 3727.
8. FOUNDATIONS, supra note 6, at 132.
9. Case 26/62, Van Gend & Loos v. Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen,
[1963] E.C.R. 1, 2 C.M.L.R. 105 (1963).
10. Case 6/64, Costa v. ENEL, 11964] E.C.R. 585, 3 C.M.L.R. 425 (1964).
11. Case 26/62, Van Gend & Loos v. Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen,
[1963] E.C.R. 1, 2 C.M.L.R. 105 (1963); Case 6/64, Costa v. ENEL, [1964] E.C.R. 585, 3
C.M.L.R, 425 (1964).
12. See generally Case 11/70, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft v. EVGF, [1970]
E.C.R. 1125, 11 C.M.L.R. 225 (1972).
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courts, the ECJ quickly announced a concept of EC human rights under
which all EC law would be scrutinized. 13 The EC's internal human rights
policy thus sprang from a desire to pacify potentially disobedient Member
States rather than from any innate sense of obligation to advance the level
of human rights protection throughout the EC.
In Stauder v. City of Ulm, the ECJ announced its new doctrine of "fun-
damental human rights enshrined in the general principles of Community
law and protected by the Court."14 In pursuit of its continuing crusade for
absolute supremacy of EC law, the ECJ boldly announced in Internationale
Handelsgesellschaft v. EVGF that the validity of EC law could be judged only
by the EC's own criteria for fundamental human rights-national notions
of human rights were irrelevant.1 5 In Internationale Handelsgesellschaft, the
applicants argued to a German administrative court that an EC export
license system violated their fundamental human rights, as defined by the
German Constitution. 16 When the case was before the ECJ, it rejected the
applicants' argument and opined that although the EC's formulation of
human rights may be inspired by national constitutional traditions, its
validity is based solely on EC law.17 Ultimately, the ECJ held that the EC
export license system did not violate the EC concept of human rights.' 8
The German courts initially reacted strongly to the ECJ's sweeping
proclamations, thus threatening the very foundations of the supremacy
principle. After the ECJ's Internationale Handelsgesellschaft opinion, the
German Constitutional Court itself addressed the issue of whether the EC
export license system violated the German Constitution. 19 It essentially
held that the EC's promise to protect fundamental human rights was an
empty one given that the EC not only failed to define what rights would be
considered fundamental human rights, but also lacked the legislative abil-
ity to do so democratically. 20 It concluded, therefore, that until the EC
could protect human rights as effectively as the German Constitution, Ger-
man courts would consider the validity of all EC measures under their own
interpretation of human rights.2 1
As a result, the ECJ's quick attempt to pacify German scholars, law-
yers, and courts failed as the German Constitutional Court flatly rejected
the ECJ's blanket claim of absolute supremacy of EC law over national
principles on human rights. Not until 1986 did the German Constitu-
tional Court hold that EC human rights law had sufficiently advanced to
13. FOUNDATIONS, supra note 6, at 133.
14. Case 29/69, Stauder v. City of Ulm, [1969] E.C.R. 419, 9 C.M.L.R. 112 (1970).
15. Case 11/70, Internationale Handelsgesellschaftv. EVGF, [1970] E.C.R. 1125, 11
C.M.L.R. 225 (1972).
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 1136.
19. Case 2 BvL 52/71, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft v. EVGF, 2 C.M.L.R. 540
(1974) (Bundesverfassungsgericht).
20. Id.
21. Id. Because the German Constitutional Court found that the EC export license
system did not violate fundamental human rights as defined by the German Constitu-
tion, it did not in fact rebel against the ECJ's holding.
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guarantee adequate protection of human rights-protection akin to that
afforded by the German Constitution. This determination made it unnec-
essary to review EC measures under the German criteria for fundamental
human rights.22 Nevertheless, the German Constitutional Court's accept-
ance of EC law supremacy is not unconditional. 23 It has reserved the abil-
ity to examine EC law according to German human rights standards
should the EC's protection of human rights fall below a level acceptable to
the German Constitutional Court.2 4
C. The Effect of the European Convention on Human Rights on
European Community Human Rights Law
The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Funda-
mental Freedoms (the Convention) was established in 1950.25 In 1979,
and then again in 1990, the Commission proposed that the EC formally
adhere to the Convention. 26 Although the Commission wanted to demon-
strate to the rest of the world that the EC actively protected fundamental
human rights, it realized that accession to the Convention depended on the
political resolve of the Member States.27
In response to the Commission's proposal, the Council requested the
ECJ's opinion on whether the EC was competent to accede to the Conven-
tion.28 Although the EC Treaty did not expressly grant the EC competence
in the area of human rights, the Commission argued that implied power
could be found in Article 308.29 This Article permits the EC to take appro-
priate measures, if EC action is necessary to attain an EC objective where
the Treaty has not provided the necessary powers. The ECJ held, however,
that the EC was not competent to accede to the Convention unless, the
Member States amended the Community treaties, thereby limiting the use
of implied powers under Article 308 and by subjecting it to the general
doctrine of conferred powers, as set out in Article 5.30 Although the Court
determined that the EC is not bound by the narrow attribution of explicit
powers in the Treaty, its implied powers are not without limits, as it must
always act within the parameters set by the Treaty.31 The ECJ acknowl-
edged that it protects fundamental rights as a general principle of law and
22. Re the Application of Wfinsche Handelsgesellschaft, [1987] 3 C.M.L.R. 225
(1987) (Bundesverfassungsgericht).
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. TEU art. 6(2).
26. Memorandum on the Accession of the European Communities to the Convention for
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, BULL. EUR. COMMUNITIES,
Supp. 2/79, at 5 (1979); Commission Press Release, IP(90)892, Oct. 31, 1990.
27. Id.
28. Opinion 2/94, [1996] E.C.R. 1-1759.
29. FOUNDATIONS, supra note 6, at 170.
30. Marise Cremona, External Relations and External Competence: The Emergence of
an Integrated Policy, in THE EVOLUTION OF EU LAw 137, 151 (Craig & de Burca eds.,
1999) [hereinafter External Relations]. Article 5 states that the EC must act within the
powers and the objectives conferred by the Treaty.
31. Id.
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that it is inspired by how Member States and international treaties seek to
protect human rights. It even proclaimed that the lawfulness of all EC acts
is dependent on respect for human rights.32 The ECJ, however, curbed the
use of this seemingly unlimited implied power by holding that Article 308
cannot be used to adopt a measure that would have constitutional signifi-
cance. 33 For example, Article 308 is not a substitute for the intentionally
lengthy procedure for Treaty amendment. Because EC accession to the
Convention would grossly modify the EC's system for protecting human
rights, and therefore would introduce immeasurable institutional implica-
tions for the Member States and the EC, accession could arise only if the
Member States amended the Treaty.34 The ECJ's holding implies that the
language in the Treaty affording human rights protections is mere "rhetoric
[that] affirms the normative commitment to the European Convention on
Human Rights, but [that] this commitment is not matched by political
practice."35
Essentially, the ECJ did not welcome the idea of the European Court of
Human Rights obtaining final jurisdiction on EC human rights issues.36
In Internationale Handelsgesellschaft, the ECJ stressed that protection of
fundamental human rights was a general principle of law that governed the
legality of all EC acts.37 The court further emphasized that the legality of
EC acts could only be judged by the EC's own constitutional criteria for
human rights; a Member State could not declare an EC act invalid on the
grounds that it violated a national conception of human rights.38 Given
the ECJ's position on the supremacy of EC law, were it required to forfeit
jurisdiction on human rights issues to an external body, such as the pro-
posed European Court of Human Rights, it would fundamentally alter the
functioning of the EC legal system. Wishing to avoid such a radical change
in the law coupled with a desire to maintain its power, the court required
explicit authority for accession through Treaty amendment by the Member
States.39 No Member State has since proposed such an amendment.
D. Conclusion
The earliest case law shows the ECJ trying to join the concepts of human
rights and EC law, mostly in an effort to pacify Member States, like Ger-
32. Opinion 2/94, [1996] E.C.R. 1-1759, 1 34. The ECJ acknowledged that it pro-
tected fundamental human rights as a general principle of law and that it was inspired
by how Member States and international treaties sought to protect human rights. More-
over, it even proclaimed that the lawfulness of all EC acts were dependent on respect for
human rights.
33. Id. (1 34-35.
34. Id.
35. Leading by Example: A Human Rights Agenda for the EU for the Year 2000, 29,
http://www.iue.it/AEL/events.htm (last visited Mar. 12, 2001) [hereinafter EU Human
Rights Agenda].
36. FoUNDATIONS, supra note 6, at 141.
37. Case 11/70, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft v. EVGF, [1970] E.C.R. 1125, 11
C.M.L.R. 225 (1972).
38. Id.
39. External Relations, supra note 30, at 151-52.
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many. Later, however, the Commission clearly tried to expand the power
of the EC in the human rights arena when it proposed the adoption of the
Convention. However, as seen in Opinion 2/94, the ECJ emphatically
dashed the Commission's efforts. This decision is particularly noteworthy
given that the ECJ is generally supportive of expanding the EC's compe-
tence-even at the price of loose Treaty interpretation.40 Opinion 2/94
could be read either in a manner that grants the EC only a very narrow
capacity to act in the field of international human rights, or in a manner
that limits its force to its facts. The constitutional implications of Opinion
2/94 are still unfolding.
II. Constitutional Issues
Every EC act must have a legal basis, meaning that an EC institution must
identify a Treaty provision or other appropriate legal authority to support
its act.4 ' This rule applies equally to internal as well as external acts of the
EC. Internally, the EC may act only to the extent that the Treaty has con-
ferred that power.4 2 Externally, the EC may enter into an agreement with a
non-Member State only if the subject of the agreement falls within an
express power granted under the Treaty4 3 or if the agreement is necessary
to attain one of the EC's objectives. 4 4 Whether acting internally or exter-
nally, recourse to the residual authority of Article 308 is appropriate only if
the EC act is "... necessary to attain... one of the objectives of the Com-
munity ... and [the] Treaty has not provided the necessary powers .... 45
A. Conferred Powers vs. General Principles of Law
Even after the changes introduced by the Treaty of Amsterdam, the Treaty
does not list the protection of human rights as one of its express objectives.
Likewise, the Treaty does not have a specific provision on human rights,
thereby placing human rights outside the boundaries of the EC's conferred
powers. The doctrine of conferred powers is the cornerstone of maintain-
ing the division of power between the EU and the Member States. In
essence, if the EU acts beyond those powers conferred by the Treaty, there
is a real likelihood that it would trespass on areas reserved to the Member
States. Because the scope of the human rights field is potentially unlimited
in the sense that it could cover nearly all activities of institutions, public
authorities, and individuals, the Member States are sensitive to affording
40. TREVOR C. HARTLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 41
(1999) [hereinafter CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS].
41. EC TREATY art. 230; Case 45/86, Commission of the European Communities v.
Council of the European Communities, [1987] E.C.R. 1493; Case C-300/89, Commis-
sion of the European Communities v. Council of the European Communities, [1991] 1.
E.C.R. 2867.
42. EC TREATY art. 5.
43. See, e.g., id. art. 133 (discussing the common commercial policy), art. 310 (dis-
cussing association agreements).
44. Case 22/70, Commission of the European Communities v. Council of the Euro-
pean Communities, [1971] E.C.R. 263.
45. EC TREATY art. 308.
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the EU a power over human rights that could encroach on areas of national
sovereignty.46 To protect national sovereignty, the constitutional principles
of limited governance and conferred powers must not be overshadowed by
recently created EC powers in the area of human rights.47 The ECJ implic-
itly adopted this limitation when it announced, in Opinion 2/94, that the
EC's jurisdiction over human rights issues applies only in the field of Com-
munity law. That is, any EC human rights policy should not extend
beyond already recognized areas of EC competence. 48
As discussed above, however, protection of fundamental human rights
is a general principle of law protected by the ECJ. 49 While respect for fun-
damental human rights is a condition of the legality of EC acts, 50a general
principle of law alone cannot constitute the legal basis for an EC act.51 In
its early cases on human rights, the ECJ used the general principle of
human rights protection as a means of interpreting EC acts.52 In addition,
the validity of an EC institution's act, whether internal or external, depends
on whether the ECJ finds it to be consistent with EC principles of human
rights. Therefore, the general principle of human rights can either be an
interpretative tool or provide the basis for striking down an act. Despite
the utility of this general principle of human rights, unless the EC can base
the entirety of its action on an express or implied EC power, as opposed to
a general principle of law, it lacks competence to take action without the
participation of the Member States through a mixed agreement.
B. Article 308 as a Legal Basis
Recently, the ECJ has limited the Commission's attempt to develop an
external human rights policy that does not require Member State participa-
tion or Treaty amendment. 53 In Opinion 2/94 the ECJ held that "[nio
Treaty provision confers on the Community institutions any general power
to enact rules on human rights or to conclude international conventions in
this field."'54 Further, the court stated that the constitutional implications
of the Convention were "beyond the scope of Article [308]."55 This lan-
guage suggests that any external agreement with imperative human rights
obligations falls outside the EC's competence as conferred by the Treaty.56
This view, however, is not widely accepted, and Opinion 2/94 has been
46. EU Human Rights Agenda, supra note 35, cl 60, at 45.
47. Id. l 60, at 45-46.
48. Id. 70, at 49.
49. FOUNDATONS, supra note 6, at 133.
50. Opinion 2/94, [1996] E.C.Rt 1-1759, 1 34.
51. External Relations, supra note 30, at 151.
52. Case 29/69, Stauder v. City of Ulm, [1969] E.C.R. 419, 9 C.M.L.R. 112 (1970);
Case 11/70, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft v. EVGF, [1970] E.C.R. 1125, 11
C.M.L.R. 225 (1972).
53. See discussion supra Part I.C.
54. Opinion 2/94, [1996] E.C.R. 1-1759, 27.
55. Id. '1 35.
56. Angela Ward, Frameworks for Cooperation between the European Union and Third
States: A Viable Matrix for Uniform Human Rights Standards, 3 EUR. FOREIGN AIF. Ray.
505, 528-31 (1998).
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increasingly afforded a narrower reading. The ECJ did not say that Article
308 provided an inappropriate legal basis for entry into agreements involv-
ing human rights; that the EC lacked competence to legislate at all in the
area of human rights; or that the promotion of human rights was not an EC
objective.5 7 Rather, the ECJ focused on the "entry of the Community into a
distinct international institutional system"58 and the "fundamental institu-
tional implications for the Community and for the Member States."59
Given the narrow reading of Opinion 2/94 and the ECJ's focus, it has been
suggested that an obligatory EC human rights policy could be adopted
based, at least in part, on Article 308 provided that it does not: (1) entail
entry of the EC into an international institutional system; (2) modify the
material content of human rights within the EC legal order; or (3) have
fundamental institutional implications. 60 Thus, to pass the ECJ's muster,
future EC human rights policies should respect the existing institutional
balance and involve only those areas in which EC competence is widely
accepted. 61
The case of Portugal v. Council passed this muster. In it, the ECJ dis-
cussed the EC's competence to engage in human rights issues within the
area of development cooperation. Portugal and Greece sought to annul a
Council decision to conclude a cooperation agreement between the EC and
the Republic of India on partnership and development.62 The agreement
had been adopted on the basis of the EC's common commercial policy
under Article 133 and development cooperation under Article 181.
Portugal and Greece, however, argued that because the human rights
clause was an essential element of the agreement, it should have been
based on Article 308 since it went beyond the primarily development-ori-
ented scope of Article 177. The ECJ, emphasizing the "importance to be
attached to respect for human rights and democratic principles," held that
the human rights clause, as an essential element of the agreement, could be
based on Article 181.63 The ECJ seemed to ground its ruling on the fact
that human rights was not a specific field of cooperation under the agree-
ment. Thus the ECJ implied that Article 181's provisions on development
cooperation could not be a legal basis for an agreement where the main
purpose was to foster democracy and fundamental human rights.64 It
should be noted, however, that because the ECJ found Article 181 to be a
sufficient legal basis for the India agreement, it did not test the limits of
57. Philip Alston & J. H. H. Weiler, An EU Human Rights Policy, in THE EU AND
HuMAN RIGHTS 3, 24-27 (Philip Alston ed., 1999).
58. Opinion 2/94, [1996] E.C.R. 1-1759, 1 34.
59. Id. 35.
60. J. H. H. Weiler & Sybilla Fries, A Human Rights Policy for the European Commu-
nity and Union: The Question of Competences, in THE EU AND HUMAN RIGHTS 147, 160
(Philip Alston ed., 1999).
61. EU Human Rights Agenda, supra note 35, 1 81, at 52.
62. Case C-268/94, Portugal v. Council, [19961 E.C.R. 1-6177.
63. Id. l 24.
64. Weiler and Fries, supra note 60, at 148; Ward, supra note 56, at 531.
Cornell International Law Journal
Article 308. As a result, it did not determine to what extent Article 308 can
be used to justify EC external human rights activity.
C. Subsidiarity
In addition to finding a legal basis for its actions, the EU must ensure that
it does not violate the principle of subsidiarity.65 This principle states that
for an EC action to be justified, it must be established that the proposed
action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States, and that it
can be better achieved by the EC.6 6 This principle, in essence, addresses
how power should be divided between Member States and the EC. Unless
the EC can act more effectively, the Member States should retain the power
to act, except in areas where the EC already exercises exclusive jurisdic-
tion.6 7 The principle of subsidiarity is based on the idea that due to the
diverse economic, political, and cultural climates of the EC, it is usually
more appropriate for Member States to make their own laws to reflect the
diversity between the regions.6 8 While one may start with the supposition
that human rights would be best regulated at the national level due to an
anticipated variety of ideologies on human rights,69 it must be
remembered that the EC has jurisdiction to legislate in the field of human
rights only within the field of EC law.70 Thus, within the parameters of EC
competence, it is a logical and necessary conclusion that the EC can better
achieve objectives of an EC human rights policy than can the Member
States, thus honoring the principle of subsidiarity.7 1
III. Treaty Amendments
Opinion 2/94 marks a turning point in the field of human rights for both
the ECJ and the Member States. On the one hand, the ECJ responded to
the German Constitutional Court's warning that it should not overextend
the EC's powers by indiscriminate use of Article 308 and the doctrine of
implied powers. 72 On the other hand, Member States showed, through
various Treaty amendments, that even though the EC could not accede to
the European Convention on Human Rights, the EC should, nevertheless,
vigorously protect and promote human rights and democracy throughout
the EC and, eventually, beyond. These treaty amendments are discussed
below, as are efforts to achieve reform outside the scope of the treaties.
65. EC TREATY art. 5.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS, supra note 40, at 85.
69. See id.
70. See discussion supra Part I.
71. EU Human Rights Agenda, supra note 35, 1cl 82-84, at 52-53.
72. Brunner v. European Union Treaty, [1994] 1 C.M.L.R. 57 (1993), 33 I.L.M. 388;
see also CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS, supra note 40, at 157.
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A. The Treaty on European Union and the Amsterdam Amendments
Until the signing of the TEU, the treaties establishing the EC did not
expressly protect fundamental human rights. But the ECJ, on its own initi-
ative, defended fundamental rights on the ground that such rights were a
general principle of EC law.73 The TEU further emphasized democracy
and human rights as cornerstones of the Union by adopting the ECJ's lan-
guage that human rights are protected as general principles of EC law and
that Member State governments are founded on principles of democracy. 74
The Second Pillar of the TEU also reflected these newly announced princi-
ples of human rights. For example, Article 11 of the TEU defines one of
the common foreign and security policy objectives as being "to develop and
consolidate democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human rights
and fundamental freedoms." 75 The EC Treaty uses language virtually iden-
tical to Article 11 of the TEU, thereby introducing an express link between
democracy and development in its provisions on development coopera-
tion.76 These provisions definitively mark the transition from an economic
community to a political body.77
Notwithstanding Opinion 2/94, Member States' attitudes appeared to
shift even further toward a more open protection of fundamental human
rights. This shift in attitude is embodied in the Treaty of Amsterdam
amendments, which markedly illustrate examples of the newly pro-
nounced Member State commitment to human rights protection and fur-
ther integration of human rights into the EC legal order. Most notably, the
Treaty of Amsterdam affirms, in Article 6(1) of the TEU, that the "Union is
founded on the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights
and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law. . ,,78 Further, in Article
6(2) of the TEU, the Treaty of Amsterdam stated that it "shall respect fun-
damental rights, as guaranteed by the European Convention for the Protec-
tion of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms[,]... as they result from
the constitutional traditions common to the Member States, as general
principles of Community law."79 Importantly, Article 6(2) of the TEU is
now specifically rendered justiciable in the ECJ under Article 46(d) of the
TEU, thereby giving the ECJ the power to enforce human rights in the EC
on a broad scale.80
The Treaty of Amsterdam also provides that if a Member State seri-
ously and persistently violates the principles of fundamental rights as
expressed in Article 6(1) of the TEU, the Council may, under Article 7 of
the TEU, suspend certain EU membership rights, including the right to
73. See discussion supra Part I.B.
74. TEU art. 6.
75. Id. art. 11.
76. EC Treaty art. 177(2).
77. The External Dimension of Human Rights Policy, from Rome to Maastricht and
Beyond, Communication from the Commission, COM(95)567, § 2.
78. TEU art. 6(1).
79. Id. art. 6 (2).
80. Id. art. 46(d). This Article states that Article 6(2) is justiciable in the ECJ.
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vote on the Council.8 1 Since such a proposal to suspend membership
rights may come from either one-third of the Member States or from the
Commission after attaining the assent of Parliament, the Treaty of Amster-
dam reaffirms both the Commission's competence to monitor Member
States' observance of human rights, and the importance of the European
Parliament's awareness and involvement in EC human rights promotion
and protection. 8 2 Furthermore, the introduction of Article 49 of the TEU
now limits the right to apply for EU membership to those European states
that respect the principles of fundamental rights set out in Article 6(1) of
the TEU.8 3
The above amendments demonstrate that human rights, as an internal
matter, are now more fully integrated into the Community legal order. Sur-
prisingly, however, the Treaty of Amsterdam does not take new steps to
.protect and promote more vigorously human rights as an external EC mat-
ter. But it has been asserted, in academic and policy circles, that through
the amendments in the Treaty of Amsterdam, which increasingly empha-
size human rights, the Member States have implicitly acknowledged that
human rights are an internal and external EC objective.8 4 In fact, some
argue that the Treaty of Amsterdam amendments on human rights require
the creation of a new EU human rights policy altogether.85
B. Reform Beyond Treaty Amendments
Calls to reform the EU's human rights policy to conform it with Treaty
rhetoric are sporadic, often depending on current political winds. In 1998,
however, the EU itself initiated a major project analyzing the present and
future direction of internal and external EU human rights policies.8 6 The
thrust of this report was that EU human rights law could not be effective as
long as its internal and external objectives were independently pursued.
Rather, the internal and external human rights policies can only be effec-
tive under a coherent, unified approach. That is, the EU should internally
meet or surpass the human rights standards it demands of third countries
in order to pursue effectively an external human rights policy.8 7 This is
particularly true where the EU requires newly associated states and coun-
tries wishing to join the EU to adopt the acquis communautaire,88 including
all EU provisions on fundamental human rights. Not only should there be
81. Id. art. 7.
82. Id.; TREATY OF AMSTERD A.
83. TEU arts. 6(1), 49.
84. Barbara Brandmer and Allan Rosas, Human Rights and the External Relations of
the European Community: An Analysis of Doctrine and Practice, 9 EUR.J. INT'L L. 468, 472
(1998).
85. EU Human Rights Agenda, supra note 35, cl 44, at 38-39.
86. See generally id.; see also European Parliament Annual Report on Human Rights
Throughout the World in 1995-1996 and the Union's Human Rights Policy, Rapporteur: Mrs.
Catherine Lalumitre, EUR. PARL. Doc. (A4-0400/96) (1996) [hereinafter 1995-1996 Euro-
pean Parliament Annual Report on Human Rights].
87. EU Human Rights Agenda, supra note 35, 1 5, at 23-24.
88. The acquis communautaire comprises the existing laws and regulations of the
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a unified human rights policy, but the EC and EU institutions must take a
more proactive role in advancing human rights objectives. The ECJ can no
longer be the sole supervisor of human rights law violations, as its effect is
limited to review of cases involving the alleged violation of human rights.8 9
Specifically, the report advocates that the existing institutional structure
should be expanded to include a new Directorate-General for human rights
issues so that the EU can create a truly unified and coordinated human
rights policy.90 Whether the EU will commit such resources and energy to
the area of human rights remains to be seen.
IV. Why Protect Human Rights?
Early case law demonstrates that the EU's efforts to promote a unified
human rights policy can be constitutionally questionable. 9 1 But, before
the EU forges ahead by imposing its own conception of human rights on
others, it should undertake the exercise of defining why it should pursue
such a policy.
The EC started as a purely economic organization with the primary
goal of securing an internal market to enhance the trading status of the EC
countries on the world stage. More than thirty years later, the EC ventured
into the field of human rights. As a collection of states, it has become a key
player in world affairs with nearly seven percent of the world's population,
twenty-seven percent of the world's gross domestic product, and as the
main provider of over half of the official assistance to developing coun-
tries.92 To what extent then, has the EU acquired the "responsibility" to
defend hfiman rights throughout the world?93 The following Section dis-
cusses whether the EU should protect fundamental human rights. Never-
theless, in addition to the legal considerations discussed above, 94 the EU
must consider the non-legal justifications for its new-founded efforts.
A. Human Rights as a Universal Issue
Whether viewed as a product of natural law or an idea inherent in a variety
of religions and cultures, humans have been defining the precise rights to
which they believe they are morally entitled for centuries. Social, cultural,
and religious forces in each individual country have generated attempts to
define human rights and how they should be protected. 95 The first effort
to protect and promote human rights on a global scale-irrespective of
political persuasion or religious belief-was the 1948 Universal Declaration
89. EU Human Rights Agenda, supra note 35, 11 53, 54, at 43-44.
90. Id. cl 55, at 44.
91. See discussion supra Part II.
92. EU Human Rights Agenda, supra note 35, '1 34, at 35.
93. Id.
94. See discussion supra Part II.
95. Bishop Carlos Filipe Ximenes Belo, The Dignity of the Individual, in RFLECTION
ON THE UNIVERsAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 62 (Barend Van Der Heijden & Bahia
Tahzib-Lie eds., 1998).
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of Human Rights (the Declaration).9 6 Even though the expression of the
rights may be culturally biased toward the West, the basic principles are
universal.9 7 Every member of the United Nations, through its endorsement
of the Declaration, transformed the Declaration into a universal acknowl-
edgement that basic human rights are common to all cultures, despite
other diversities. The signatories formally recognized that these basic
rights are inherent in humankind.98 Most importantly, the Declaration
made the promotion and protection of human rights a truly international
issue.9 9 To justify its own external human rights policy, the EU borrows
the Declaration's concepts of universality and indivisibility. 10 0 By promot-
ing human rights as a universal principle, the EU can more easily assert
that it is morally right to link the protection of fundamental human rights
with trade and development policy-especially if such rights are deemed
indivisible.1 1 Indivisibility means that human rights are interdependent
and interrelated with other well-recognized rights. That is, it is impossible
to separate civil, political, economic, social, and cultural rights.10 2 On this
platform, the EU often claims a moral justification for externally projecting
its human rights policies.
By acting as a block, the EU projects "multilateral conditionality" in
the sense that all fifteen Member States must agree to promote human
rights.10 3 As a result, the EU's human rights policy is a collective pro-
nouncement, not the views of one super-state. Thus, as with the Declara-
tion, the EU maintains that any moral overtones achieve legitimacy through
numbers.
B. A Western Slant
Critics of the notion that basic human rights are common to all cultures
argue that the protection of human rights in any individual country is a
96. G.A. Res. 217 (III), U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948).
97. See Pierre San6, An Unfinished Revolution, in REFLECTIONS ON THE UNIVERSAL DEC-
LARATION OF HuMAN RIGHTS, supra note 95, at 281.
98. Gabrielle Kirk McDonald, The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: The Inter-
national and the American Dream, in REFLECTIONS ON THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION or
HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 95, at 180.
99. William Pfaff, Everyone Has a Responsibility, in REFLECTIONS ON THE UNIVERSAL
DECLARATION OF HuMAN RIGHTS, supra note 95, at 237.
100. Brandmer and Rosas, supra note 84, at 484-87; Proposal for a Council Regula-
tion on the Development and Consolidation of Democracy and the Rule of Law and
Respect for Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, COM(97)357 final [hereinafter
Council Regulation on the Development and Consolidation of Democracy]; Council
Regulation 975/1999, 1 5, 1999 OJ. (L 120) 1; Council Regulation 976/1999, 1 5,
1999 OJ. (L 120) 8; Council of the European Union, European Union Annual Report on
Human Rights, § 5.2., available at http://ue.eu.int/pesc/humanrights/en/99/
main5.htm (last visited Oct. 1, 1999) [hereinafter 1999 EU Annual Report on Human
Rights].
101. Emma Bonino, Humanitarian Aid and International Policy, in REFLECTIONS ON THE
UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 95, at 70.
102. Brandtner and Rosas, supra note 84, at 485.
103. Karen E. Smith, The Use of Political Conditionality in the EU's Relations with Third
Countries: How Effective, 3 EUR. FOREIGN AFF. REV. 253, 257 (1998).
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domestic issue and is particularly indicative of state sovereignty. Thus,
when the EU imposes its human rights standards on another country, it is
not only an illegitimate intervention in the third country's internal affairs,
but also an unwarranted challenge to the third state's sovereignty. Propo-
nents of this position argue that the EU should limit its interaction with
other countries to strengthening economic and political ties. The promo-
tion of economic and political activities would, though indirectly, increase
human rights protections. For example, increased economic activity and
positive political consequences are likely to lead to a democratic structure
that protects the fundamental rights of its citizens. Making trade and devel-
opment assistance conditional upon one-sided human rights observance,
the argument continues, is actually counterproductive to the overall promo-
tion of human rights.104
In addition to the above critique, it is worthwhile to examine the
assumption that fundamental human rights necessarily flow from demo-
cratic societies. The complexity of the human rights issue is illustrated by
the enormous differences in cultural experiences that have generated com-
peting concepts of the rights of the individual and obligations of soci-
ety.105 Some forcefully argue that the Declaration is not universal; rather,
it is a statement of Western philosophy, as evinced by the emphasis on the
individual at the expense of community solidarity. 10 6 More specifically,
critics insist that the EU presupposition that democracy and human rights
are necessarily linked is an impermissible imposition of Western imperial-
ism. 10 7 Western sermons on the indivisibility of democracy and human
rights are inappropriate given that the West is blind to the cultural diversity
that affects perceptions of what human rights are and how they can best be
protected.
The correct view, according to this line of thought, is that rights inher-
ent in political objectives should be separate from those fostered by trade
policy. Fundamental rights, whatever they include, are necessarily and
properly distinct from economic and trade relations between states. For
example, if the EU imposes sanctions on a country it judges to be inade-
quately protecting human rights, the effect could be to isolate those who
need help most, and therefore generate even more instability leading to
further violations of human rights.' 08 Due to the complexity of the issues,
critics argue, the promotion of human rights policies should not be con-
trolled by one or several countries, including the EU. International cooper-
ation and mutual respect are sufficient vehicles by which to effectuate
104. See Ali Alatas, An Indonesian View on Human Rights, in REFLECTIONS ON THE UNI-
VERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 95, at 25.
105. Id. at 23.
106. Pfaff, supra note 99, at 237.
107. See Report on the Communication from the Commission on the Inclusion of
Respect for Democratic Principles and Human Rights in Agreements Between the Com-
munity and Third Countries, COM(95)216, Motion for a Resolution, TI I-K [hereinafter
Report on the Communication from the Commission on the Inclusion of Respect].
108. Franklin L. Lavin, Asphyxiation or Oxygen? The Sanctions Dilemma, FOREIGN
POI'Y, Fall 1996, at 138.
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human rights protections throughout the world. 10 9 The EU's aggressive
opinion is not only unsolicited, but unwanted and inappropriate.
C. Morality and Inconsistency
The universality versus non-universality of human rights debate does not,
in actuality, permeate EU thinking on how it should best protect and pro-
mote human rights among its trading partners. As a general principle, the
EU takes a moral stance by proclaiming that human rights are a universal
and indivisible component of its political and trade relations with third
countries. The EU does not, however, always apply this general principle
in specific cases, particularly if it is not politically or economically expedi-
ent or if it is deemed to be an improper intrusion into domestic policy
spheres. This inconsistency stems from the EU's vacillation over whether it
is morally right to pursue an external human rights policy. However, if
morality is removed from the equation, the formula simplifies. In this new
light, the EU's application of its human rights policy is both understanda-
ble and consistent.
In practice, the EU's human rights policy is based on power, not
morals. It projects its notion of human rights when it can, whether for an
expected economic return or because it deems it morally just to do so. In
effect, the EU does not ask whether it is right or wrong to impose its moral-
ity on a third state; it asks only whether it has the ability to do so. Deriving
its strength and power from an economic base, the EU unilaterally imposes
human rights clauses in bilateral agreements to spread its collective notion
of fundamental human rights. 110 It plays a normative role by using eco-
nomic power to spread its ideal of democracy and human rights.11 1 But, it
does this only where it has sufficient economic strength, thus demonstrat-
ing a total lack of moral commitment to an apparently moral policy. If the
EU's human rights policy were based on morality, the price of attaining
that morality, even if it meant the loss of trading relations with a powerful
partner, would not be relevant to its policy development or execution.
Therefore, the EU's "responsibility" to protect human rights lacks a strong
moral foundation and is not "reinforced" by its financial resources, but is
totally dependent upon them. 112
V. The Evolution of an External Human Rights Strategy
As internal human rights law developed in the EU, the institutions gradu-
ally put greater emphasis on external application, or imposition, of its
human rights policies. First, the institutions joined the ECJ in protecting
human rights and developing internal policies. Then the institutions' poli-
cies soon spilled over into the EU's external affairs. This projection into
the external realm started slowly in the area of development cooperation
109. Alatas, supra note 104, at 24.
110. See generally Smith, supra note 103.
111. Id.
112. Cf. EU Human Rights Agenda, supra note 35, l 4, at 22-23.
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policy but quickly spread to broad trade areas and even foreign policy.
Why the EU jumped into the external realm and continues to press its
conception of external human rights on third countries is the pivotal issue
behind the global development of its human rights policies.
A. Early Efforts at Human Rights Clauses
The Third Lome Convention of 1982 marked the EC's first attempt to
establish human rights as a fundamental component of its development
policy with the Afro-Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) states. 113 Despite the
EC's intentions, the provisions were ineffective in practice as they did not
condition the EC's continuation of the Lome development schemes with
the respect for human rights. 114 By 1991, the EC recognized this weakness
and included in the Fourth Lome Convention (Lome IV) the first real
"human rights clause." 115 Article 5 of Lome IV stated that "cooperation
operations shall be conceived in accordance vith the positive approach,
where respect for human rights is recognized as a basic factor of real devel-
opment and where cooperation is conceived as a contribution to the pro-
motion of these rights."116 While bold in the sense that it was a new,
tougher style of human rights clause, it still drew criticism. In particular,
the European Parliament criticized it for not including either the respect for
democracy as a basic human right, or an enforcement mechanism for cases
of infringement.117
Later in 1991, upon an initiative from the Commission, the Council
issued a resolution on human rights, democracy, and development to serve
as a direct impetus for consistently including human rights clauses in EC
agreements-especially those related to development cooperation. 118 The
resolution advocated the universal character of human rights and expressly
tied human rights to democracy. Furthermore, to remedy the deficiencies
of the Lome IV clause, the Council's resolution listed specific conse-
quences for the infringement of human rights clauses in EC agreements.1 19
In general, the Council preferred to adopt a positive and constructive
approach, as opposed to negative measures or sanctions, to deal with
113. Third ACP-EEC Convention, Dec. 8, 1984, 24 l.L.M. 571 (1985). The first two
Lomd Conventions did not mention human rights. As a reaction to the horrific work of
Uganda's Idi Amin in the mid-1970's, the EC insisted on incorporating human rights as
an objective of development cooperation with the ACP countries. See also Smith, supra
note 103, at 259.
114. Ward, supra note 56, at 507-508.
115. Marise Cremona, Human Rights and Democracy Clauses in the EC's Trade Agree-
ments, in THE EUROPEAN UNION AND WORLD TRADE LAW: AFTER THE GATT URUGUAY
ROUND 62 (Nicholas Emiliou & David O'Keeffe eds., 1996) [hereinafter EU AND WORLD
TRADE LAW].
116. Fourth ACP-EEC Convention, Dec. 15, 1989, 29 l.L.M. 783 (1990).
117. Smith, supra note 103, at 259; Ward, supra note 56, at 508.
118. EU AND WORLD TRADE LAW, supra note 115, at 63; Resolution of the Council and of
the Member States Meeting in Council on Human Rights, Democracy and Development,
BULL. EUR. COMMUNITIES, 11-1991, at 122 (1991).
119. Id.
Cornell International Law Journal Vol. 34
deficiencies. 120
The unifying theme of the EC's various human rights strategies is con-
ditionality. This means that third countries must work to establish a
democracy and protect human rights as a condition to receiving aid from
the EC. 12 1 As a result, trading preferences, cooperation and association
agreements, aid, diplomatic recognition, and eventual EU membership
have all been made conditional on respect for human rights and democ-
racy.12 2 In April 1997, the Council adopted a conclusion on the future of
the EC strategy of conditionality. 12 3 The Council stated that bilateral rela-
tions with third countries should be developed in a framework that pro-
motes democracy, the rule of law, higher standards for minorities, and
human rights. 124 Third countries' relationships with the EC would pro-
gress in tandem as they fulfilled the EC's conditions. 125 In other words,
the EC measures the third country's progress as it jumps through the
hoops of complying with EC mandates and human rights conditions.
As a result, since the early 1990s, human rights clauses have been
regularly included in EC development cooperation, trade, and association
agreements. 126 These clauses appear in either weak or strong forms,
depending on the available enforcement mechanism. The so-called weak
versions generally contain language that the agreement is based on respect
for democracy and human rights. This language, however, does not pro-
vide an essential element to the agreement. 12 7 Therefore, violation of the
clause is not sufficient to find either a material breach of the agreement or
even to justify unilateral suspension of the agreement. 128 The strong ver-
sion of human rights and democracy clauses, which the Commission first
began using in 1992, provides that respect for human rights and demo-
cratic principles is an essential element of the agreement. 12 9 Thus, accord-
ing to the Commission, the strong version provides a legal basis and a
justification in international law for taking proportionate reactive mea-
120. The EC is limited in its ability to impose full economic sanctions by its obliga-
tions under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. While the suspension of
underlying GATT-based obligations is impossible, the EC can rely on United Nations
Security Council resolutions to impose a trade embargo to the extent that GATT allows
parties to maintain international peace and security. See Cremona, supra note 115, at
71-73.
121. See generally Smith, supra note 103.
122. Id. at 253.
123. Council Conclusions on the Principle of Conditionality Governing the Development
of the European Union's Relations with Certain Countries of South-East Europe, BULL. EUR.
UNION, 4-97, at 132 (1997).
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. It should be noted that these human rights clauses merely reflect commonly
shared values and reaffirm commitments which, as a matter of international law,
already bind states, as well as the EC. See Brandtner & Rosas, supra note 84, at 473; see
also EU AND WORLD TRADE LAW, supra note 115, at 62; 1999 EUAnnual Report on Human
Rights, supra note 100, § 4.2.5.
127. EU AND WORLD TRADE LAw, supra note 115, at 71.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 72-75.
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sures in response to a breach of human rights standards. 130 It was not
until the mid-1990s, however, that the EC regularly employed the strong
form of human rights clauses, thus firmly linking the principles of human
rights and democracy to its trade policy. 13 1
B. The Model Human Rights Clause
In May 1995, the Council adopted a more aggressive approach to the inclu-
sion of human rights clauses in EC agreements by creating a model human
rights clause. 132 The model clause stipulates that respect for fundamental
human rights and democratic principles, as laid down in the Declaration,
inspires the internal and external policies of the EC and the third coun-
try.133 Importantly, the Council expressly stated that the model clause
should be an essential element of bilateral agreements in order to form the
basis for the implementation of positive or negative measures, ranging from
confidential reproaches to total suspension of cooperation, depending on
the gravity of the human rights offenses.134 This new flexibility permits
the EC to act in accordance with the long-standing principle of proportion-
ality. As an essential element, the model human rights clause could form
the basis for a material breach of the agreement, which under the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, is a legitimate ground for suspending
the agreement.13 Although EC human rights clauses acquired the force of
an essential element, the overriding aims of maintaining dialogue between
the trading partners and ensuring that the local population was not pun-
ished for unacceptable government behavior remained the same.136
The European Parliament wholly supported the Commission's move to
make human rights a more integral and effective part of relations with third
countries. It emphasized the close links between human rights and democ-
racy; the need for the EU to be able to respond quickly to human rights
violations; the importance of making human rights issues part of the nego-
tiating mandate for external agreements; and the desire to ensure that legal,
political, and moral values remain central to European identity. 137 In
expressing the views of the Member States, the Parliament specifically rec-
ommended using bilateral agreements as a "lever" to encourage improved
human rights, good governance, and the rule of law. 138 Indeed, the Parlia-
ment believed that the model clause could develop into the "most efficient
policy instrument on human rights."1 39 The EU's newly expressed sup-
130. Id. at 72.
131. Id. at 74-75.
132. See generally Report on the Communication from the Commission on the Inclu-
sion of Respect, supra note 107.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 7, 17.
135. Id. at 8; Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, art. 60(3), 8
I.L.M. 679.
136. Report on the Communication from the Commission on the Inclusion of
Respect, supra note 107, at 7.
137. Id. at 4-5.
138. Id. at 10.
139. Id. at 16.
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port of human rights was, in the Parliament's words, "intrinsic to a modern
vision of humanity" and something that "confer[red] prestige and moral
authority on the European Union." 140 This moral authority, however, is
often exercised selectively, contrary to the primary purpose of the 1995
model clause. 141
The 1995 model clause has since been incorporated as an essential
element in all subsequently negotiated bilateral agreements of a general
nature.142 Unlike most previous human rights clauses, it enables the EC to
suspend the agreements to punish severe human rights violations. The ECJ
confirmed this approach in Portugal v. Council, in which it recognized that
human rights clauses could enable the EC to suspend or terminate an
agreement if a third state violated human rights according to standards set
by the EC. 143 In sum, the model clause strives to provide consistency in
the application, interpretation, and enforcement of future human rights
clauses. While this clause appeared to make the EC's external human
rights policy more universal-the same standard would purportedly be
applied uniformly, regardless of the substance of or the parties to the agree-
ment-these human rights clauses in reality were not always consistently
enforced, or even accepted by the parties to the agreement. 144
C. Recent Legislation
The two most recent pieces of legislation on human rights were adopted by
the Council on April 29, 1999. The legislation concerns the requirements
for implementing in third countries projects and operations with the aim of
promoting democracy, the rule of law, and fundamental human rights and
freedoms. 145 The two regulations are similar in content, but have separate
legal bases: Article 179 provides the legal basis for operations involving
development cooperation,' 46 and Article 308 provides the legal basis for
all other operations. 147 While the different legal bases will affect the
140. Id. at 13.
141. See discussion infra Part IV.C.
142. 1999 EU Annual Report on Human Rights, supra note 100; id. at 16, § 4.2.5.
Human rights clauses are generally excluded from sectoral agreements covering discrete
subject areas between the EU and third states, which could lead to inconsistent reactions
by the EU to human rights abuses. See Ward, supra note 56, at 519.
143. Case C-268/94, Portugal v. Council, [1996] E.C.R. 1-6177, I 27; Brandtner &
Rosas, supra note 84, at 474.
144. In 1996 Australia refused to accept a human rights clause as part of a trade and
cooperation agreement. Instead, Australia and the EU adopted a political declaration.
See Joint Declaration on EU-Australia Relations, BULL. EUR. UNION, 6-1997, at 117-18
(1997).
145. Council Regulation 975/1999, 1999 OJ. (L 120) 1; Council Regulation 976/
1999, 1999 OJ. (L 120) 8.
146. Council Regulation, 975/1999, 1999 OJ. (L120) 1; EC TREATY art. 179.
147. In the Commission's original proposal (COM(97)357 final), the only legal base
suggested was Article 179. Council Regulation on the Development and Consolidation
of Democracy, supra note 100, preamble. The Committee of Permanent Representatives
(COREPER), however, argued that this legal basis alone would not cover operations
outside the area of development cooperation. Thus, in November 1997, the Commission
split the proposal into two separate acts: one based on Article 179 for developing coun-
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extent to which the Member States are involved,148 the aim of both regula-
tions is to develop a more coherent external human rights policy in addi-
tion to providing a definitive legal basis for the financing of projects to
implement that policy. 149 The preambles of the regulations recite the
importance of coordinating the EC's human rights policy with the EU's
foreign policy as a whole, and specifically with the common foreign and
security policies. Additionally, the regulations aim to give EC action on
human rights, democracy, and the rule of law a stronger identity. EC sup-
port may include financing a wide range of projects, including campaigns
to increase public awareness, feasibility studies, technical assistance,
equipment and facility usage, monitoring capabilities, and regular evalua-
tion procedures. i50 Furthermore, the regulations provide for the creation
of the Human Rights and Democracy Committee.' 5 ' This Committee is to
be composed of representatives of the Member States and is chaired by a
representative of the Commission,' 5 2 thus ensuring consistent Member
State participation and elevating the importance of a coherent human
rights policy within the Commission itself.
The new regulations, while detailed and seemingly comprehensive in
scope, have nevertheless been subject to criticism in several respects. First,
the regulations appear to address two broad groups of third countries: 1)
those that have development cooperation or preferred trade agreements
with the EU and 2) those in Central and Eastern Europe that currently
benefit from EU aid programs, such as TACIS, MEDA, and PHARE.' 5 3 The
issue then becomes, what about the rest of the world? The new regulations
do not cover human rights objectives within non-preferential trade agree-
ments, like those with the U.S. In other words, the EU should be able to
address human rights issues in all countries, irrespective of their industrial
status or governmental structure.
Second, on an institutional level, the regulations have the effect of cen-
tralizing power within the Council and Commission and away from the
Parliament. Rather than being involved in the substance of the EC's human
tries, and the other based on Article 308 for operations in non-developing countries. See
Common Position (EC) No. 15/1999, 1999 OJ. (C58) 17, 25. It now appears conclusive
that Article 308 (EC) is a legitimate basis for the EC's external human rights activities.
EC TP.EATY art. 308.
148. Under Article 308 EC, the Council's decision must be unanimous, whereas
under Article 179 EC, the cooperation procedure is used.
149. Council Regulation 975/1999, 1999 OJ. (L 120) 1; Council Regulation 976/
1999 OJ. (L120) 8.
150. Council Regulation 975/1999, art. 3, 1999 OJ. (L 120) 1,4; Council Regulation
976/1999, art. 4, 1999 OJ. (L 120) 8, 11.
151. Council Regulation 975/1999, art. 13, 1999 OJ. (L 120) 1, 6; Council Regula-
tion 976/1999, art. 14, 1999 OJ. (L 120) 8, 13.
152. Council Regulation 975/1999, art. 13, 1999 OJ. (L 120) 1, 6; Council Regula-
tion 976/1999, art. 14, 1999 OJ. (L 120) 8, 13.
153. Through Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States
(TACIS), the EC assists the New Independent States resulting from the collapse of the
Soviet Union. The MEDA regulation provides a vehicle for EC assistance to Mediterra-
nean countries. Poland and Hungary Assistance for the Restructuring of the Economy
(PHARE) supports reform in many central and Eastern European countries.
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rights policy, the Parliament may exercise influence only through the budg-
etary procedure. 154 Even though the Human Rights and Democracy Com-
mittee protects the interests of the Member States, it does not directly
represent the people of Europe to the extent the Parliament does. Ideally,
the Parliament should have as much influence as the Member States,
whether Member States are represented through the Council or the Human
Rights and Democracy Committee, so that the EC itself can set an example
of democratic accountability that it demands of third countries. 155 Lack of
democratic accountability is a chronic criticism leveled at EU activities. 156
These new regulations exacerbate the situation.
Lastly, because the regulations together earmark more than 400 mil-
lion euros over five years for human rights projects, there must be adequate
measures to guard against corruption and misuse of funds. 15 7 The regula-
tions do not address issues such as how complaints can be lodged and
investigations instigated to examine how the funds are spent or how the
policies are administered. 158
As the above regulations are still in their infancy, their effect is
unknown. Nonetheless, they have the potential to contribute significantly
to a more coherent approach to the EC's external policies in fundamental
human rights. These regulations could enable the EC to move away from a
sectoral human rights approach and toward a more global incorporation of
human rights in all areas of its international relations.' 5 9
D. Human Rights Under the Second Pillar
Title V of the TEU provides for the EU's common foreign and security pol-
icy, also known as the Second Pillar of the EU or common foreign and
security policy (CFSP). 160 One of its objectives is to "develop and consoli-
date democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human rights and fun-
damental freedoms.' u 61  Because the Second Pillar is largely
intergovernmental in nature, the Council takes the lead in creating and
effectuating the EU's common foreign and security policy, largely through
the adoption of common positions. 162 As there are no geographical limits
to the CFSP, the EU could use it as a vehicle to cast a wide net for its
human rights policies.
The Second Pillar has the infrastructure to support broad human
rights policies. In an effort to enhance awareness and effectiveness of
CFSP policies and goals, the Treaty of Amsterdam assigns the function of
154. EU Human Rights Agenda, supra note 35, 1 158, at 86.
155. Id.
156. CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS, supra note 40, at 18-21.
157. EU Human Rights Agenda, supra note 35, 1 159, at 86.
158. Id. 1 159, at 85.
159. Brandtner & Rosas, supra note 84, at 483.
160. TEU tit. V.
161. Id. art. 11.
162. Because the EU lacks legal personality, it cannot conclude agreements with third
countries. Instead, it must either have the participation of the Member States or use
unilateral measures, such as common positions.
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High Representative to the Council's Secretary General. In addition, the
CFSP High Representative assists the Council President in representing the
EU in common foreign and security policy matters on the world stage.16 3
Because human rights protection is a CFSP objective, the High Representa-
tive could encourage the Council to become more proactive in the human
rights arena-a job made easier by the fact that action under the Second
Pillar is largely consensual and without any constitutional limitations.16 4
In becoming more proactive, the Council could essentially include human
rights as one component in its overall relations with any foreign coun-
try.165 Including human rights as an explicit objective of the Second Pillar
is yet further evidence that the EU intends to expand its external human
rights policy, as action taken under the CFSP is, by definition, outward
looking. Whether the High Representative will accept this challenge, how-
ever, remains to be seen.
E. A Promising Foundation-Will the EU Use It?
Overall, the link between human rights and negative measures, such as
sanctions in the form of suspension of aid or trade preferences, gradually
gave way to a more positive approach of encouraging the growth of demo-
cratic institutions, thereby strengthening the rule of law and promoting
human rights initiatives. 16 6 The EU's legislative direction seems to demon-
strate its commitment to developing a foreign policy based on human
rights and democratic principles by making aid conditional upon the ful-
fillment of standardized notions of human rights and democracy. Simi-
larly, the Second Pillar provides significant latitude for Member States to
recognize human rights as a basic tenet of EU foreign policy. The EU's
resolve, however, can shift according to political winds.
VI. Effectiveness: A Function of Politics
From its internal to external applications, the EU's human rights policy has
evolved from being an afterthought to the ECJ's attempt to maintain
supremacy of EC law over Member States' national laws, 16 7 to an aggres-
sive pursuit of a global human rights standard through conditionality
clauses in bilateral agreements with its trading partners. While its human
rights policy grows bolder, the question remains as to whether it is simulta-
neously growing more effective. Are the EU's human rights policy pro-
nouncements followed by corresponding applications of that policy? The
best yardstick by which to measure the EU's commitment to its external
human rights policy is its willingness to defend the human rights clauses
in its bilateral agreements. Likewise, the EU's enthusiasm for amending
old agreements to include human rights clauses is also instructive.
163. TEU art. 18.
164. EU Human Rights Agenda, supra note 35, 165, at 88.
165. Id. c 169, at 89.
166. Id. ct 20, at 30.
167. Case 29/69, Stauder v. City of Ulm, [1969] E.C.R. 419, 9 C.M.L.R. 112 (1970).
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In short, how strong are the links between the EU's external human
rights policies and its current development cooperation and trade policies?
By comparing disparate attitudes toward China and Myanmar, it becomes
evident that the EU's human rights policies are essentially an exercise of
economic power, not morality. Thus, as the EU's economic power is lim-
ited, so is its commitment to developing and defending human rights on a
global scale.
A. China
In 1978, the EC and China entered into their first trade agreement. 168 As
relations expanded, mostly through increased EC exports, loans, and
investments in China, these partners concluded a new Trade and Economic
Cooperation Agreement in 1985. The 1985 agreement was broader in
scope than the first trade agreement and provided for cooperation in trade
and economic matters. 169 While the agreement includes a most-favored-
nations (MFN) clause, a balance of trade clause, and clauses on exchange
of information and consultations to promote trade, it does not include a
human rights clause. 170 In addition to the agreement, EC trade with China
is governed by a general Council regulation on common rules for imports
from State-trading countries. 171 Moreover, the EU maintains a running
dialogue with China on human rights. Twice a year ministers from the EU
and Chinese governments meet to discuss the EU's concerns about human
rights developments, or lack thereof, in China.172 Additionally, the Asia-
Europe Meeting serves as a platform for dialogue between Asian and EU
countries on many issues, including human rights. 173
The EU has espoused the importance of improving trading relations
with China for several years. Not only did the end of the Cold War support
democratic reform in the former Eastern European states, but it seemed to
kick-start the transition to market economies in many Asian countries. As
the economies grew and the Asian nations increased their wealth, the large
Asian populations became ready sources of new consumers. In 1994 the
World Bank predicted that economic growth in Asia would ensure that by
168. Trade Agreement between the European Economic Community and the People's
Republic of China, 1978 Oj. (L 123) 2.
169. Agreement on Trade and Cooperation between the European Economic Commu-
nity and the People's Republic of China, 1985 Oj. (L 250) 1 [hereinafter 1985 Agree-
ment]; see also Francis Snyder, Legal Aspects of Trade Between The European Union and
China: Preliminary Reflections, in THE EUROPEAN UNION AND WORLD TRADE LAw: AFTER
ThE GATT URUGUAY ROUND, supra note 115, at 363, at 366 [hereinafter Legal Aspects of
Trade].
170. 1985 Agreement, supra note 169.
171. Council Regulation EC No. 519/94, Common Rules for Imports from Certain
Third Countries, 1994 Oj. (L 67) 89. Note, this regulation does not affect trade in
textiles, which is governed by a separate regulation. See Francis Snyder, INTERNTIONAL
TRADE AND CUSTOMS LAw OF THE EUROPEAN UNION 595 (1998).
172. 1999 EU Annual Report on Human Rights, supra note 100, § 4.2.3.
173. Id. Interestingly, EU relations with China were only temporarily interrupted
with China following the events of Tiananmen Square. The EC instituted trade sanctions
between June 4, 1989 and October 22, 1990. Legal Aspects of Trade, supra note 169, at
365.
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the year 2000, one billion Asians would have "significant" consumer spend-
ing power, 400 million of whom would have disposable incomes equal to
or greater than their European and U.S. counterparts. 174
Despite the economic potential, EU direct investment has historically
been much lower in China than in other emerging markets, causing the EU
to conclude that it is missing business opportunities in China and must,
therefore, pursue the Chinese markets as aggressively as those in the
United States and Japan. 175 As a result, EU-China trade continues to grow
at a rapid pace, although the EU has usually imported more from China
than it has exported to China.' 76 During the 1990s, the trade deficit
remained in the eight to ten billion ECU range.17 7
In 1994, the Commission stated, in a communication to the Council,
that human rights would be a "major objective" of the EU's external policy
with Asia.178 The Commission characterized the need for stronger Euro-
pean-Asia ties as a "matter of urgency" if the EU was serious about main-
taining a leading role in the world economy. 179 While the Commission
mostly recommended increased economic relations and political dialogue,
it also stated, "[Miatters relating to good governance, including human
rights, should also play an important role in the Union's relations with
Asian countries."1 8 0 In fact, it listed, as an overall objective of EU-Asia ties,
that the EU would "contribute to the development and consolidatione [sic]
of democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human rights and funda-
mental freedoms in Asia."18 1 Further, human rights is listed as a subject
for discussion to enhance political dialogue with Asia, though the Commis-
sion declared that the EC cannot impose European values on Asian coun-
tries.18 2 The Commission, however, did not suggest taking positive steps
to promote human rights, such as supporting elections and a free media,
and at no point did it suggest linking human rights improvements to
increased economic trade.' 8 3
Indeed, the Commission seems to justify its own hesitation to link
human rights with trade issues by highlighting that the U.S. "shifted" its
trade policy toward Asia by extending MFN status to Chinese exports-
thereby de-linking trade and human rights. In the Commission's words,
the U.S. shift may be regarded as a "move towards a more long-term strat-
174. Communication from the Commission to the Council, Towards a New Asia Strat-
egy, COM(94)314 final, at 1 [hereinafter Towards a New Asia Strategy].
175. Communication from the Commission, A Long Term Policy for China-Europe
Relations, COM(95)279 final, at 9 [hereinafter A Long Term Policy for China-Europe
Relations].
176. Id.
177. Id. A European Currency Unit [ECU] is a fluctuating value calculated from a
basket of national currencies which are weighted according to their strengths.
178. Towards a New Asia Strategy, supra note 174, at 3; see also EU AND WOLD TRADE
LAw, supra note 115, at 67-68.
179. Towards a New Asia Strategy, supra note 174, at 1.
180. Id. at 2.
181. Id. at 3.
182. Id. at 12, 18.
183. See generally id.
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egy aimed at influencing developments in China by further integrating
China into world trade and economic relations." 184
Similarly, the Commission chose to de-link human rights and Asian
trade issues. Although it proclaimed that fundamental human rights are a
major objective of the external policy of the European Union, it also stated
that "[t]he concept of the interrelationship between human rights, democ-
racy and development, should be inspired by the assumption that eco-
nomic development could bring about the progressive construction of civil
society and thus improve the exercise of human rights, which in their turn
could also be an important factor for development."' 85 Basically, the Com-
mission announced that human rights relations with Asia should be con-
fined to a political field, thereby excluding human rights policy as a basis
for economic cooperation. This philosophy seems distinctly at odds with
the notions of conditionality' 8 6 and is particularly unsettling given the
EC's introduction of its model human rights clause the following year.
The European Parliament clearly disagreed with the EU's proclaimed
stance that there should be no fixed link between trade and human rights
and used EU relations with China to express its disagreement.' 8 7 In Feb-
ruary 1994, it adopted a resolution calling for China to respect human
rights and fundamental freedoms as well as adopt internationally
respected social standards.' 8 On the issue of human rights, the Parlia-
ment stressed the universal nature of human rights, as defined by the Dec-
laration, to which China is a signatory.' 8 9 Specifically, it called on China
to end its use of the death penalty, create a legal system independent of the
political system, halt torture and forced abortions, and respect the rights of
minorities and political dissidents. 190
On trade, the Parliament noted that China still must more fully open
its markets to competition to correct the trade imbalance between the
regions. 191 It also insisted that future trade or cooperation agreements
must be accompanied by human rights clauses. 192 Unless China under-
took efforts to increase democracy and improve its human rights record,
the Parliament advised that the EU should not approve any new coopera-
tion agreements. Unlike the Commission, the Parliament maintained that
true improvement in China's human rights affairs would not happen with-
out a direct link to trade agreements. The Parliament, however, was
ignored.
184. Id. at 8.
185. Id. at 12.
186. See discussion supra Part V.A.
187. Legal Aspects of Trade, supra note 169, at 375.
188. European Parliament, Resolution on Relations between the European Union and
the People's Republic of China, 1994 OJ. (C 61) 71-74 [hereinafter Resolution on Rela-
tions between the European Union and China].
189. Id. at 72.
190. Id. at 72-73.
191. Id. at 73.
192. Id. at 74.
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Without heed to the Parliament's critique of EU-China affairs, the
Commission further refined its views for future relations with China in a
1995 communication.' 93 Again, the Commission refrained from directly
linking human rights and trade issues. Rather, it concentrated on the
importance of creating an "action-oriented" policy reflecting China's rap-
idly increasing economic and political influence throughout Asia and the
world.1 94 According to the Commission, better relations with China would
serve not only Europe's economic interests, but its foreign security and
environmental interests as wVell.1 95
In the 1995 communication, the Commission addressed the impor-
tance of human rights as a basis for all EU policies and proclaimed it nec-
essary for long-term political and social stability.196 Effectiveness is
deemed the most important element of the EU's human rights policy, given
that there is a "danger that relying solely on frequent and strident declara-
tions will dilute the message or lead to knee-jerk reactions from the Chi-
nese government."' 97 This language appears to be typically cautious, yet
stronger than its language the previous year when the Commission hesi-
tated to impose European values on an Eastern society.' 98 To maximize
the effectiveness of its human rights policy in China, the Commission pro-
posed that the EU encourage the development of a Chinese society based
on the rule of law, aim to regularly raise human rights issues in all bilateral
dialogue with China, and involve the international community in its dia-
logue with China through multilateral platforms, such as the United
Nations Commission on Human Rights.
But, in language reminiscent of its 1994 communication, the Commis-
sion summarized that "EU policy is based on the well-founded belief that
human rights tend to be better understood and better protected in societies
open to the free flow of trade, investment, people, and ideas." 199 In other
words, if the EU can further economic ties with China, heightened aware-
ness of human rights will automatically follow. While the Commission
advocated "practical cooperation" in the form of assistance in the judicial
and legal fields as a means of helping China develop a society based on the
rule of law, it did not recommend doing so if it meant compromising the
development of important economic and trade relations.200
Three years later, the Commission updated its long-term strategy
towards China due to China's continued market reforms and increased role
in regional and global foreign policy, as well as the financial crisis that hit
193. A Long Term Policy for China-Europe Relations, supra note 175.
194. Id. at 1.
195. Id. at 2.
196. Id. at 4.
197. Id.
198. Resolution on Relations between the European Union and China, supra note
188, at 71-74.
199. A Long Term Policy for China-Europe Relations, supra note 175, at 5.
200. Id. at 6.
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Asia in 1997.201 The Commission predicted that China's perception of
Europe might alter due to changes within the EU, such as eastward expan-
sion, the single currency, and enhanced foreign policy power for the EU
under the Treaty of Amsterdam.20 2 One of the aims of the revised partner-
ship was to support China's development as a society based on the rule of
law and respect for human rights.20 3 Yet, as in 1995, the Commission
established no link between trade and human rights policies.20 4 In fact, it
expressly stated that dialogue on human rights, "without any precondi-
tions ... remains at present the most appropriate means of contributing to
human rights in China."20 5 The Commission sees dialogue as a means of
achieving cooperation programs, yet there is no suggestion that those coop-
eration programs, such as support for programs that foster the rule of law
or strengthen civil society, should be conditioned on China's respect for
human rights.
In addition to general EU strategies, specific agreements can be effec-
tive tools for achieving human rights goals. Many EU trade and coopera-
tion agreements negotiated before 1995 did not contain any human rights
clauses. When the EC formally declared that it would include human
rights clauses in all subsequently negotiated agreements, the European Par-
liament called on it to renegotiate existing trade agreements to add such
clauses. 20 6 The European Parliament's position was consistent with its ear-
lier declaration that the EU's strong policy approach to human rights
should engender the prestige and moral authority necessary to accomplish
its goals.207
To date, however, the EU has not renegotiated the 1985 Trade and
Cooperation Agreement with China to include a human rights clause, nor
have human rights clauses been included in newer, sectoral trade agree-
ments with China.20 8 Unless the Trade and Cooperation Agreement with
China is renegotiated to include an effective human rights clause, relations
with China will continue to evolve without regard for serious binding com-
mitments to human rights in China.20 9 The primary fear of human rights
proponents is that the EU's trade relations with China will take the form of
sectoral agreements that are not, as a matter of policy, affected by human
rights clauses.2 10 For example, in 1988 the EC and China entered into a
201. Communication from the Commission, Building a Comprehensive Partnership
with China, COM(98)181 final, at 3 [hereinafter Building a Comprehensive Partnership
with China].
202. Id. at 4.
203. Id.
204. See generally id.
205. Id. at 9.
206. 1995-1996 European Parliament Annual Report on Human Rights, supra note 86, at
67.
207. See generally Report on the Communication from the Commission on the Inclu-
sion of Respect, supra note 107.
208. Ward, supra note 56, at 520.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 527.
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textile agreement which is periodically extended.211 In 1995, an even nar-
rower agreement addressing silk and linen was concluded.212 If trade with
China continues to develop on a sectoral basis, whether the general 1985
Trade and Cooperation Agreement is amended to include a human rights
clause will become unimportant. As more products fall outside the 1985
Trade and Cooperation Agreement, the less influence the agreement will
have as a tool to force the improvement of human rights in China.
The Commission dearly desires to smooth relations with China so
that important commercial deals can succeed. Given the high importance
attached to increasing trade with China and including China in global
affairs, the EU does not presently consider it in its long-term interest to
pursue an aggressive stand on human rights in China. Rather than issue
conditions, the EU issues declarations. And instead of linking human
rights and trade issues, it expressly de-links them. The Commission seems
to argue that if commercial deals are hampered by meddlesome EU policies
on human rights, the trade with China may not progress as rapidly as
hoped, thus leading to a worsening of human rights conditions within
China. As noted by one scholar, "the Union's policy on human rights in
China has been moving away from one characterized by persistent and
robust criticism, to a more delicate and protracted strategy of constructive
dialogue."213
Ironically, although the volume of dialogue on human rights in China
is now lower, the frequency and status of the discussions has increased.
Since 1994, EU-China dialogue has occurred at a higher level than ever
before in an effort to encourage Chinese participation in a wide range of
global affairs.214 The desired dialogue is as broad as "issues of common
interest and global significance" which should foster the necessary
exchange of views as a precursor to coordinated development on global
and regional security interests, as well as human rights.2 15 The Commis-
sion has proposed that the EU and China "raise the status of their relation-
ship by holding annual summits at Head of State and Government level" so
that the EU-China relationship acquires the status and importance of the
EU's relationships with other major trading partners, like Japan and the
United States.216
Even the topic of human rights in China has been elevated to new
heights. In its first Annual Report on Human Rights, the EU gives particu-
lar attention to China's human rights situation. The EU is primarily con-
cerned with restraints on freedom of opinion, expression and assembly,
extensive and seemingly political use of the death penalty, and arbitrary
211. Legal Aspects of Trade, supra note 169, at 369.
212. Id. at 372; Agreement between the European Community and the People's
Republic of China on Trade in Textile Products not Covered by the MFA Bilateral Agree-
ment, 1995 OJ. (L 104) 2.
213. Ward, supra note 56, at 520.
214. A Long Term Policy for China-Europe Relations, supra note 175, at 4.
215. Id.
216. Building a Comprehensive Partnership with China, supra note 201, at 5.
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detention and the use of forced labor camps.217 Additionally, religious and
cultural minorities, such as the Tibetans, continue to suffer violations of
their human rights under Chinese rule. Unfortunately, however, the EU's
pronouncements still have no teeth. While the EU unabashedly states that
it "intends to make the human rights dialogue with China focused and
more orientated towards concrete improvement in the human rights situa-
tion,"218 it offers no tools with which to accomplish that goal. Its declara-
tion is only that-a declaration without a means of execution.
Despite the rhetoric calling for action-oriented policies, the EU contin-
ues to issue, in effect, mere declarations when it comes to human rights.
Improved relations with China is the EU's primary focus because of
China's economic importance. So important is China's economic position
that its tangential goal of raising the standard of global human rights has
been pushed to the back burner. Meanwhile, the Chinese economy stews
and thickens, free from Western conceptions and imposition of human
rights.
B. Myanmar
In contrast to China, the EU's reaction to human rights violations in
Myanmar is markedly different. The different treatment of these two coun-
tries' human rights abuses demonstrates that the EU's human rights policy
rests on perceptions of power, rather than declarations of morality.
In 1980, the EU entered a cooperation agreement with the Association
of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) to strengthen regional integration and
consolidate commercial relations between the EU and southeast Asia.219
Although ASEAN allowed Myanmar to join it in 1997, the EU refused to
open negotiations for Myanmar to accede to the EC-ASEAN cooperation
agreement due to its horrific human rights record, and in particular, its
regular use of forced labor.220 The EU essentially demanded that
Myanmar improve its human rights record, as well as its overall political
situation, before it would consider allowing Myanmar to accede. 221 Much
of the responsibility for eradicating the abuses in Myanmar was placed on
ASEAN itself, as the EU and U.S. insisted that ASEAN fulfil its promise of
"constructive political commitment" by creating policies aimed specifically
at improving human rights and democracy in Myanmar.222 Until ASEAN
can demonstrate that it can manage and improve the situation in Myanmar,
the latter will remain outside the EC-ASEAN cooperation agreement. 223
Also in 1997, the EU withdrew Myanmar's benefits under the EC's
Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), again due to its unacceptable
217. See generally EU Annual Report on Human Rights, supra note 100.
218. Id. § 4.2.3.
219. The current members of ASEAN are Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia,
Laos, Myanmar, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam.
220. Agence Europe No. 7025, Jul. 28-29, 1997.
221. Id.
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human rights record concerning the use of forced labor.224 After hearings
and confidential statements, the EU concluded that forced labor was rou-
tine and widespread, without regard for the sex, age or health of the
affected individuals.225 The EU withdrew GSP support for industrial and
agricultural goods until such time as Myanmar demonstrated that it no
longer used forced labor.2 26 In support of the EU's proposed action, the
Economic and Social Committee praised the measure as "a clear signal to
the EU's trading partners that the EU is serious about its determination to
use the GSP to meet the goals for which it was created, namely to improve
the conditions of people in the developing countries .... -227 The Commit-
tee also cited European public opinion as a justification for the EU's deci-
sive action.228 Indeed, the EU's withdrawal of GSP preference was
characterized as a response to "[t]rade unions, non-governmental organiza-
tions including human rights groups and consumer organizations [which]
have all expressed support for the taking of strong measures by the EU."229
The Committee noted that public human rights campaigners drew particu-
lar attention to the fact that EU multinational companies may indirectly
benefit from the use of forced labor and requested that the Commission
"pay special attention" to the involvement of these multinational compa-
nies when it monitors human rights developments in Myanmar.230
Because the human rights situation in Myanmar is still dire, the EU
has pressed ahead with efforts to punish the country both economically
and politically. InJune 1999, the EU supported the adoption, by the Inter-
national Labor Conference, of an emergency resolution on forced labor in
Myanmar.231 The resolution declared the government's use and endorse-
ment of forced labor to be incompatible with membership in the Interna-
tional Labor Organization (ILO) and therefore removed ILO technical
assistance from Myanmar. 232 In October 1999, the EU extended its origi-
nal common position on relations with Myanmar.233 Through this com-
mon position, the EU has effectively severed diplomatic relations with
224. 1999 EU Annual Report on Human Rights, supra note 100, § 4.2.5. The GSP is the
scheme under which the EC grants non-reciprocal trade preferences to developing coun-
tries as a means of using trade as a development tool.
225. Council Regulation (EC) 552/97, Temporarily Withdrawing Access to Genera-
lized Tariff Preferences from the Union of Myanmar, 1997 OJ. (L 085) 8-9 (Mar. 24,
1997) [hereinafter Temporarily Withdrawing Access]; Proposal for a Council Regulation
(EC), COM(96)711 final, at 1-2.
226. Temporarily Withdrawing Access, supra note 225, at 9; Proposal for a Council
Regulation, COM(96)711 final, supra note 225, at 2.
227. Opinion of the Economic and Social Committee, 1997 OJ. (C 133) 47.
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Myanmar. Until Myanmar makes progress towards democratization and
improves its human rights record, the common position will be renewed
every six months.234
C. Different Treatment for Different Countries
The EU responded relatively swiftly and harshly to the human rights
abuses in Myanmar. Its moral stance sends a clear signal to the Myanmar
government that unless it cleans up its human rights record, it will be
increasingly shunned on the world trading stage. The EU exercised its
moral authority by judging the human rights situation in Myanmar unsat-
isfactory, and therefore a sufficient justification for halting GSP prefer-
ences. It enjoyed the advantage of appeasing the outraged public, even to
the extent that it recognized the previously unchecked role played by EU
multinational companies. The EU's action toward Myanmar is wholly con-
sistent with its rhetoric of the last decade regarding why human rights
improvement should be a paramount goal of EU external policy.
With China, however, the situation is different. The human rights
abuses in China, including mass government-endorsed executions, the
repression of freedom of speech, religion and reproductive rights, along
with a steady abuse of cultural and ethnic minorities are, one could easily
argue, as serious as the human rights abuses in Myanmar. In fact, the EU
itself consistently stresses that all human rights have "equal value. '235 But
with China, the EU boldly states that it must not impose its Western values
on Eastern society and that a human rights policy can be better pursued
through political rather than economic channels. Nowhere does the EU
take account of public opinion in its relations with China. The EU chooses
to take significant action regarding human rights abuses in Myanmar, but
merely criticizes abuses in China. Why the difference?
Money. In its various proposals for a long-term relationship with
China, the Commission repeatedly stresses the importance of China to
Europe. China provides millions of consumers for EU products. With its
economic reforms and potential membership in the World Trade Organiza-
tion, China is fertile ground for foreign investment in large sectors like utili-
ties and telecommunications. China is also strategically important from a
foreign policy perspective. As a nuclear power, China will play an increas-
ingly important role in regional and global foreign policy affairs. China, in
other words, cannot be effectively lashed with European morality without
consequential financial harm to Europe. Any action that the EU takes that
hinders trade relations, such as issuing sanctions, suspending trade coop-
eration, or withdrawing GSP preferences, in response to human rights vio-
lations will only slow the EU's realization of economic gain. Due to the
economic promise China holds, as well as the stiff competition from the
U.S. and Japan, the EU cannot afford to let morality interfere with its need
to trade competitively with China.
234. Common Position on Burma/Myanmar, supra note 233, c 7.
235. 1999 EU Annual Report on Human Rights, supra note 100, § 5.1.
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Myanmar, however, is nearly expendable. It is a bit actor on the world
trading stage, it is not a nuclear power, and it lacks a vast consumer base to
offer European producers. In this situation, the EU can afford to take the
moral high ground by proudly and publicly withdrawing GSP trading pref-
erences. It has little to lose economically and much to gain politically by
firmly linking human rights to trade issues with Myamnar. Unfortunately,
the EU has too much to lose should it take this stand with China.
D. The Achievements of Evolution
As the comparison between EU human rights policies toward Myanmar
and China shows, the doctrine of conditionality competes with other con-
siderations of foreign policy, such as commercial, geopolitical, and strate-
gic interests. "Weak" states are more likely to suffer interruption of human
rights aid than are "strong" states.236 Strong states, like China, which have
a more secure bargaining position with the EU tend to get only light sanc-
tions, such as declarations and dmarches. The European Parliament has
criticized this apparent inconsistent application of the EU's human rights
policy, stating that "the EU bodies apply double standards when reacting
to human rights abuses from different countries depending on their eco-
nomic and strategic potential."2 37 But, if one views the EU human rights
policy as an exercise in power and not morality, there is no inconsistency
in policy application. Rather, the EU exercises its economic power to
achieve human rights goals to the extent that it is economically feasible.
Where the EU lacks sufficient economic power to influence fundamental
human rights in a third country, as is the case with China, its position on
human rights becomes more flexible and less critical to trade negotiations.
Conclusion
To say that the EU has a "double standard" is misleading. The only stan-
dard the EU has is that based on practical feasibility, if not possibility.
This reactive, flexible approach to human rights is far from the moralistic
and aggressive pursuit of human rights that the EU sets forth in its treaties
and resolutions. The EU has decided that it must first establish clear eco-
nomic supremacy before it can really influence human rights development
and impose its morals on "strong" countries, like China. With a weaker
trading partner, like Myanmar, the EU can afford to make policy based on
morals. Within the internal sphere, the EU need worry only about accept-
ance by its Member States, as illustrated by the EC's frantic efforts to ease
Germany's constitutional concerns over human rights protection. Within
the external sphere, however, it must recognize and contend with the limits
of its ability to significantly affect human rights throughout the world. The
EU has demonstrated that it is prepared to champion human rights causes
only as far as its economic might allows.
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